To what extent does Karl von Clausewitz explain the changing nature of Essay

To what extent does Karl von Clausewitz explain the changing nature of warfare after 1798 - Essay ExampleClausewitzs primary(prenominal) claim in his book On War published in 1831 revolves around the fact that in order to understand warfare, it must be considered as a social phenomenon. War comes from deliberate circumstances and these circumstances make wars easier to understand. This statement was considered in the light of two conceptions of war at that time, first, that war is suitable of elongate solutions, and secondly, that war is basically chaotic and cannot be rationally evaluated (Gat, 1989). This view of war led to the perception that it is merely an offshoot of politics, mixed is with violence. This perception hid a more complex phenomenon. First and foremost, war has changed over time. Since social organizations have changed over the years, the nature of parties competing has also changed. Secondly, in seeking a better collar of what is happening in conflicts, there is no longer a need to consider the military events in a political setting. Third, there is a prescriptive element in the formula. Clausewitz was of the belief that force was more acceptable when it was considered as a tool for state policy. Considering the suffering caused by war, this was the justifiable reason utilize in the use of violence however a normative failure would not negate the analytical process. (Clausewitz, eds, Howard and Paret, 1979, p. 586). In order to establish a serviceable understanding of war, there was a need to evaluate the relationship between military activities and the political climate of these events. On the outset, there was a direct linear link between the scale of the goal sought and the extent of force required to fulfill it. In a conflict which was carried out to conquer an thwarter who aimed to totally conquer and annex a country, one is almost always certain to expect significant efforts to defeat the aggressor. On the other hand, where a l ittle objective was sought, a smaller consequent action would be seen. Clausewitz was of the understanding that events on the battlefield and in the political arena are very more than related to each other. A battlefield victory might prevent other nations from being embroiled in any conflict, it may also urge them of the fact that a victor has become a threat to them (Szabo, 2008). A victory may also convince a nation that its competitor is clean and that it needs to improve its objectives. The consideration of a country deciding to intervene or step away from a conflict would